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Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument against considering intuitions as evidence has an uncharitable 
consequence — a substantial part of philosophical practice is not justified. A possible solution to this 
problem is to defend that philosophy must be descriptive metaphysics. But if this statement is rejected, one 
can only argue (a) that experts’ intuition does constitute evidence, and (b) that philosophical practice is 
justified by the overall growth of philosophical knowledge it generates.  
 
 
Intuition as Philosophical Evidence 
 
Analytic philosophy uses intuitions all the time. Philosophers usually say that such and 
such a thesis is intuitive, or intuitively plausible. Or that such and such a position is 
counterintuitive, or has very little intuitive support. All these uses seem to suggest that to 
intuit that p is, at least, a reason to accept it. (Or that it purports prima facie a justification 
for the intuited proposition.) Similarly, if a certain proposition, or theory, or proposal is 
judged as counterintuitive, or as having little intuitive support, this would seem to be a 
reason, if not for rejecting it, at least for not being forced to accept it.  
 
But the supposed evidential weight of intuition can be challenged. One of those 
challenges has been raised by Earlenbaugh and Molyneux. In Earlenbaugh and Molyneux 
2009, they defend that it is not necessary to postulate that intuition counts as evidence in 
order to explain the role it plays in analytic philosophy.  
 
It is not clear what an intuition is.1 Nevertheless, Earlenbaugh and Molyneux treat it as a 
kind of inclination to believe. In what follows, I will assume this thesis. I will be 
particularly interested in those intuitions which seem to resist review, and which do not 
obtain evident support from something more basic —some belief, for example— than the 
inclination the agent has to believe it. Moreover, I will not be interested in all intuitions, 
but only in those intuitions that p characterized by the following: the agent also believes 
that p.2 
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In the rest of this article, I will explore the possibilities of justifying philosophical 
practice as increasing knowledge over time. In order to do so, I will present an image of 
intuition as a kind of theory-laden inclination to believe that plays the role of evidence.  
 
 
1. Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument against the idea of intuitions as evidence 
 
In Earlenbaugh and Molyneux 2009 (pp. 40-1), the authors present the following 
argument against intuitions as evidence of the truth, justification or correctness of 
philosophical theses: 
 
1- If philosophical inquiry is typically, or at least often, concerned 
with troublingly extra-mental facts and entities, then intuition cannot play 
its supposed evidential role in philosophical inquiry. 
 
2- Philosophical inquiry is typically, or at least often, concerned with 
troublingly extra-mental facts and entities. 
 
3- Hence, intuition cannot play its supposed evidential role in 
philosophical inquiry. 
 
Earlenbaugh and Molyneux believe that, since each premise is true, and the argument has 
a modus ponens form, then the conclusion is also true. As they recognize that most 
philosophers make use of intuitions, they must either accept that a substantial portion of 
analytical philosophy is unjustified, or they must defend that the role of intuition has been 
mistaken. They adopt the latter approach. They claim that intuition is a kind of inclination 
to believe. The arguments that make use of intuition as a reason to accept some specific 
thesis are successful —in case they are— because the audience shares that specific 
intuition with the philosopher. Or, in other words, they all share the same type of 
inclination to believe. This explains why some arguments are persuasive. But that does 
not turn them into a good justification for their conclusions.  
 
Nevertheless, Earlenbaugh and Molyneux argue that this does not imply that intuitions 
should not count as evidence. According to them, what should be concluded from their 
argument is just that it is not necessary to claim that intuitions are a kind of evidence, in 
order to explain their role in philosophical argumentation. But the conclusion to their 
argument is precisely the same: intuitions cannot be evidence.  
 
In any case, it can be accepted that intuition has some evidential weight. For example, if 
one accepts that the stronger an inclination to believe, the more likely to be true is its 
content, then firmly held intuitions are more likely to be true than mere hunches or 
guesses. So if one intuits that p, then one has a reason —no matter how weak this reason 




may be— to believe that p is true. Something analogous can be said about shared 
inclinations to believe (as opposed to those held only by an individual). But if one seeks 
to defend that actual philosophical practice is a fruitful epistemic activity, then one 
should reject at least one of the premises in Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument. 
Before exploring this topic, let us describe in greater detail the reasons Earlenbaugh and 
Molyneux present for their premises.  
 
 
2. Philosophy and extra-mental reality 
 
The reasons Earlenbaugh and Molyneux present to support (1) are precisely those 
suggested by Goldman in Goldman 1992. He makes a distinction between descriptive and 
prescriptive metaphysics. The former attempts to describe, in a systematic way, our 
conceptual scheme, our metaphysical intuitions. The latter seeks to find what there really 
is “out there,” i.e., what the really existing things are. It is clear that intuitions play a 
central role in the descriptive metaphysics approach, because when we do descriptive 
metaphysics we are trying to describe and systematize them. We have, so to speak, 
privileged access to our mental states, and intuitions are a kind of mental state. But it is 
not clear which role intuitions play in the prescriptive approach. One might think that, if 
they are in a position to play a role at all, it is because they are a reliable guide to truth. 
That means that, if one intuits that p, then p is more likely to be true than if one did not 
intuit that p.  
 
However, intuitions change over time and across philosophers. Furthermore, many of the 
philosophical intuitions held in the past are now considered false. Thus, it seems highly 
unlikely that intuition may be a reliable guide to truth.  
 
Goldman’s conclusion is that, since intuitions count as philosophical evidence, but the 
only things they can be evidence of are the elements in our conceptual scheme, the main 
goal of philosophy is to systematize our conceptual scheme. Nevertheless, this 
“mentalist” position is not widely accepted. Philosophers seem to think themselves as 
trying to get things right about morality, validity, time, change, or necessity, and not 
about what we think about those issues. But if this is correct, then those who think that 
intuition plays a key part as a kind of philosophical evidence should explain how it is —
reliably— connected with those issues. Some of those terms refer to purely abstract 
objects, with no causal connection at all. In Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s words:  
 
But if we conclude […] that the objects of philosophical inquiry can be 
mind-independent matters that extend beyond the limits of concept 
application then we must explain how armchair inquiry, using intuitions, 
can possibly provide evidence for them; in particular, how it can provide 
evidence concerning objects (like pure possibilia) that play no causal role 




in this universe, or objects (like abstract objects) that play no causal role 
period, or facts (like normative facts) that do not obviously involve 
causally potent truth-makers. Let all such things —that are not only extra-
mental but which also, as far as we can gather, bear no reliable epistemic 
connection to the mental— be dubbed “troublingly extra-mental facts and 
entities.” (Earlenbaugh and Molyneux 2009, p. 39.) 
 
Since we have no satisfying explanation of this connection, philosophical intuitions 
become suspicious. This makes a difference between intuitions and other types of 
inclinations to believe, such as inclinations to believe perceptual propositions in a 
specific situation. Perception is a reliable source of true beliefs. Moreover, we have a 
scientific explanation of the way perception functions, and how perceptions connect 
reliably with the world. Until we have something similar with intuitions, all normative 
philosophy based on intuition seems unjustified.  
 
But even if there is a connection between some intuitions and those “troublingly extra-
mental facts and entities,” one still needs to prove the connection between the remaining 
intuitions and philosophical phenomena. Intuitions may be psychologically homogeneous, 
but are probably epistemically heterogeneous, as Earlenbaugh and Molyneux have 
claimed.  
 
… it is prima facie unlikely that our metaphysical, modal, moral, 
epistemic and semantic inclinations to believe are all connected to the 
truth via a single consistently reliable mechanism, given that the abstract 
and concrete, actual and non-actual targets of those intuitions are so 
diverse. But if our intuitions connect to their truth-makers via different 
mechanisms (or, as a special case, if they do not connect at all) then they 
are therefore reliable (or not) to radically different extents. (Earlenbaugh 
and Molyneux 2009, p. 39.) 
 
So why is it that arguments that take intuitions as evidence are successful? Well —they 
are not. But —this much is true— they are persuasive, at least if the intuitions they use 
are shared with the audience. This does not make it a “good” argument. It may be one, if 
the intuition taken as evidence is legitimate. But we still need some proof that there is this 
kind of intuitions.  
 
Let’s examine now some ways to resist Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument.  
 
 
3-(No matter) What Philosophy talks about 
 




Rationality, Validity, Moral Good, Truth, Possibility, and Meaning are some of the 
philosophical topics. What philosophers want are theories that allow them to get a better 
understanding of each and every one of them. In this article, I intend to be as neutral as 
possible about the issue of what Philosophy is —or “talks”— about. Philosophy might or 
might not be about topics that are not “things” or “objects.”3 It might also deal with 
things that can be reduced to sociological, psychological or biological entities. The 
central point that I want to make remains the same.   
 
Now, as Earlenbaugh and Molyneux remember, most philosophers seem to reject the idea 
that what Philosophy is about —and what philosophers talk about— is, or supervenes in, 
mental entities. In order to deny this thesis —i.e., that Philosophy is not about mental 
entities—, an independent argument is required. But if it were true, premise (ii) in 
Earlenbaugh and Molyneux’s argument is false, because then we do have privileged 
access to what Philosophy talks about —i.e., some kind of mental phenomena. So 
intuition could count as evidence in this scenario.4  
 
Indeed, most philosophers are inclined to believe that they are doing something different 
when they develop philosophical proposals. More precisely, they believe that something 
like the second premise is true. What they do is present positive theories —or sketches of 
them— about philosophical topics. They put forward formal models of vague notions, 
what logical theories do with the notion of validity or truth preservation (in case these are 
two different notions), what rational decision theories do with the idea of a rational 
attitude in particular, and rationality in general, what metaphysical theories try to do with 
the idea of possibility, and what moral theories do with the notions or right and duty. It is 
not necessary for the formal notion to be coextensive with the intuitive or pre-theoretical 
notion, and sometimes it is better if not. Moreover, one would hope that the formal notion 
of “set” is not coextensive with the intuitive one, because the latter leads to 
contradictions. A similar point can be made about other philosophical concepts and 
fields. What right now is important to us is (a) whether the philosophical practice that 
takes intuition as prima facie evidence is epistemically justified, and (b) whether intuition 
is evidence, more or less understood as something that raises the probability of truth of 
the proposition intuited. I will explore the reasons that make the philosophical practice —
understood as something more than a way to clarify our conceptual scheme or our 
concepts— that takes intuitions as evidence a reliable mechanism for discovering 
philosophical truths.  
 
 
4. In what sense intuition is a reliable mechanism 
 
There is no one and only accepted conception about what makes a certain procedure or 
faculty reliable. Nevertheless, I will adopt the following version: an epistemic procedure 
or faculty is reliable if and only if the conditional probability of a proposition, given the 




fact that it was the result of an application of that procedure or faculty, is generally higher 
than the absolute probability of the proposition. If intuition is a reliable way to discover 
philosophical truths, then intuition provides evidence to the truth of the proposition 
intuited. What needs to be proved, then, is that to intuit that p makes p more probably 
true.  
 
A way to defend this is to claim that not all intuitions are reliable. Only experts’ 
intuitions are. The reason is that we are only interested in intuitions of propositions that 
are also believed. If we are talking about this kind of experts’ intuitions, then, if an expert 
intuits that p, then p is more probably true (than if no expert had that intuition), because 
experts’ beliefs (about the particular field they are experts at) are a reliable source of 
truths.5  
 
A similar defense of experts’ intuition is made by James McBain, in McBain 2008. 
McBain claims that all intuitions are theory-laden. When someone claims that a certain 
case of justified true belief is also a case of knowledge —in a Gettier’s case—, her 
judgment is influenced (i.e., informed) at least by her informal or “folk” theories about 
knowledge, belief, justification, and truth. Every theory —related to the point— that an 
individual accepts will influence the way she will attribute notions to particular 
situations, and the way she thinks that notion is related to others. The expert will have 
better theories, so her judgments will be better. But it is also the case that she would have 
thought more and better about the point. Then, her judgments and inclinations to judge 
(including her intuitions) will be more reliable than those of ordinary people.  
 
Let’s take an example. Most people without philosophical training are inclined to think 
that a sentence like “The King of France is bold” is clearly false. Nevertheless, most 
experts will reject that judgment. Some will think that it is not the case that the sentence 
is false because it does not have any truth value. Some others, although they might think 
that the sentence is false, would reject that it is clearly false, because they find it plausible 
to defend the idea that such sentence has no truth value.  
 
A common objection to this position is that the wide disagreement in all areas of 
Philosophy proves that the expert’s intuitions are not so good as one may think. The 
existence of these disagreements seems to reveal that intuition cannot be evidence in 
philosophy. 
 
A possible answer is to claim that the fact that intuitions are philosophical evidence is the 
best way to explain a certain reasonable reaction to those disagreements. Some 
philosophers defend that, when one faces a situation where at least two different 
philosophers disagree about a certain point, after examining all the relevant evidence, it is 
rational not to pronounce on that issue. Richard Feldman, David Christensen and Adam 
Elga6 believe something similar to this. Some disagreements of this kind also represent a 




collision of intuitions. Why is it rational to suspend judgment about the point of 
disagreement? This is because the judgment by each expert provides prima facie 
evidence, which is canceled in the face of evidence to the contrary. In particular, that 
evidence might be the opposite judgment by another expert —in this case, another 
philosopher. This is a charitable picture of what is going on, because it assumes that we 
are mostly rational when we act this way. But it implies that intuition does count as 
evidence.  
 
When I say that intuition counts as evidence, I mean that it raises the probability of what 
is being intuited.7 But this does not mean that intuition provides conclusive evidence for 
the proposition intuited. One cannot prove anything just because one has the right 
intuition. The inquiry about it remains open. That is what conclusive evidence does. For 
example, that is what logical proofs do. This –conclusive evidence— is what we want, 
but what we rarely find. Thus, we avoid a significant risk that this position faces: statism. 
 
By “statism” I mean the attitude of those who think that there is no good reason to keep 
on searching for a good explanation to a certain phenomenon. The position defended here 
avoids statism, precisely because it claims that it is not enough to intuit that p to give up 
inquiry about p. For this to be rational, the intuition has to provide conclusive evidence. 
And the position defended does not imply that intuition does —actually, I think it does 
not.  
 
This constitutes a first reason for the use of intuition as evidence in Philosophy. It claims 
that, if the experts’ beliefs are prima facie justified, then some particular intuitions are 
also prima facie justified. This might be judged as a weak support of the use of intuitions, 
because the experts’ beliefs reliability might also be challenged. Besides, at this point, 
one might ask the following: if intuition does not provide conclusive evidence, why is it 
important to have intuitions? And, more importantly: how is it that a (philosophical) 
practice based on intuitions is epistemically justified? The answer to these last questions 
will provide a second reason for the use of intuition as philosophical evidence. 
 
 
5. The justification of philosophical practice 
 
A good part of Analytic Philosophy is based on intuitions. If that practice is not an 
epistemically reliable mechanism, then it should be left behind as a way to increase our 
knowledge. It may be a useful tool in order to get a better understanding of our 
conceptual scheme, and the concepts we —individually or collectively— have, but it is 
useless as a way to help us understand what validity (or rationality, or good) is.8  
 




Another —though related— problem faced by this conception of Philosophy is expressed 
in the request Katie Couric made to David Christensen. This is how Christensen 
reconstructs the situation:  
 
If you’d like to make a professional philosopher uncomfortable, try asking 
for clear examples of our discipline’s achievements in settling the 
questions we study: 
Katie Couric: I’m just going to ask you one more time –not to 
belabor the point. Specific examples, in the last 2600 years, of important 
philosophical questions settled… 
Philosopher (visibly straining to look upbeat): I’ll… try to find ya 
some, and I’ll bring ‘em to ya! (Christensen 2009, p. 1.) 
 
I have no satisfying reply to Couric, either. There might be some, and probably more than 
one would initially think. What is sure is that we do not really make focus on them. But, 
if Philosophy is an epistemically justified practice, there should be. We have a lot of 
philosophical theses. We have more than a lot of arguments for or against them. Those 
arguments help to clarify the plausibility of the theses. What we get from them are some 
conditional truths. I claim that those conditional truths are at least part of the 
philosophical knowledge gained through the History of Philosophy. They justify the idea 
that knowledge in Philosophy is possible, and actual. They also help explain in what 
sense it can be claimed that there is progress in Philosophy. 
 
I will give just two examples, which may help clarify what I have in mind. The first one 
is about the semantics of evaluative terms. At least part of the merit of Relativism about 
(the meaning of) evaluative terms is that it contributes to explain how it is that faultless 
disagreements are possible. If someone says “Ice creams are tasty,” and someone else 
says “Ice creams are not tasty,” then they seem to disagree. But, at the same time, it also 
seems that neither of them is doing anything wrong, that no one is violating a rule of 
assertion. Thus, Relativism gives an explanation of faultless disagreements. It claims that 
the truth value of these kinds of assertions is relative to an evaluative standard fixed by 
the context of assessment. But not everyone accepts that there really are faultless 
disagreements. Contextualists, for example, reject this.9 So it is not at all clear that it 
should be something good about Relativism that it helps explain cases of faultless 
disagreement. Nevertheless, if faultless disagreements about evaluative terms are real, 
then, as relativist theories claim, the truth value of assertions with evaluative terms is 
relative to a standard fixed by the context of assessment.  
 
A second example: Modus ponens seems to be a valid form of inference. Nevertheless, in 
McGee 1985, Van McGee presents some examples of modus ponens with indicative 
conditional, which seem to have true premises and a false conclusion. McGee argues that 
in relation to the indicative conditional, it is not possible to have both modus ponens and 




the Importation/Exportation Principle, which claims that for any propositions A, B, and C 
(A → (B → C)) if and only if ((A & B) → C). McGee claims that the 
Importation/Exportation Principle is obviously true. So modus ponens cannot be valid. In 
fact, both McGee and his critics accept that, in relation to the indicative conditional, it is 
not possible to have both modus ponens and the Importation/Exportation Principle, and if 
one is valid, then the other is not.10  
 
A possible objection to this position is the following: any supposed philosophical 
conditional can be doubted, and is, strictly speaking, false. That is because the inferential 
relation between the antecedent and the consequent depends on a series of non-explicit 
presuppositions. For example, about evaluative terms, Relativism explains faultless 
disagreements only if non-standard parameters can be included in the circumstances of 
evaluation. On the other hand, the Importation/Exportation Principle about the indicative 
conditional is valid if and only if modus ponens about indicative conditional is not, only if 
the indicative conditional is different from the material or the counterfactual conditional. 
 
This objection seems unfair. Any scientific truth presupposes that some ceteris paribus 
conditions are met. Under a similar argument, any scientific truth can be questioned. This 
consequence is untenable in the case of scientific truths. So one plausible solution to this 
problem is to apply a similar strategy in the case of philosophical truths as the favorite 
solution to the scientific case. For example, it can be accepted that scientific “truths” are 
not, strictly speaking, true. But they are once they become the consequent of some 
conditional that has a conjunction of the ceteris paribus conditions as antecedent. The 
same approach could be taken with philosophical “truths.”  
 
Nothing I have defended presupposes that non-conditional philosophical truths are 
impossible, or non-actual. Nevertheless, this substantive knowledge, if any, is certainly 
not that “exciting.” Maybe the non-contradiction principle is the traditional candidate. 
But even this common-sense principle has been rejected by paraconsistent philosophers, 
who accept that there are some situations in which a certain proposition and its negation 
can both be true.11  
 
But even if we accept the point that we are in a better epistemic position because we have 
a large amount of conditional knowledge that we did not have in the past, why is it that 
this fact justifies a philosophical practice based on intuitions? Well, it does. That is 
because it motivates and encourages the production of more and better arguments for and 
against philosophical theses. And those arguments help find the conditional truths that 
justify the idea of philosophical progress.   
 
This does not mean that philosophical practice is the only kind of practice that produces 
arguments, or that it is the only one capable of producing them. Neither does it mean that 
current practice is the best possible philosophical practice. But it is not necessary to 




conclude any of these theses to justify the philosophical practice based on intuitions. 
What is necessary is to encourage the idea that such practice is a reliable mechanism. 
And it is, provided that its outputs are the kind of conditional truths I have mentioned.  
 
It can be objected that Philosophy has other goals. It aims at producing the best theories 
about a number of philosophical topics, not at producing those conditional assertions. But 
there seems to be no philosophical substantive (and relevant) theory whose truth is 
sufficiently well-established.  
 
There is some truth in the previous paragraph. If we already have those theories, then 
Philosophy is as epistemically justified as Science. It is not, because we do not have those 
theories. But that does not imply that it is not justified at all. It is, because it increases our 
knowledge. This may seem an external justification, because we are interested in 
substantive theories, not in the kind of conditional assertions which seems to be the only 
ones available. But the justification is not that external. A substantive part of 
philosophical activity consists in providing and evaluating reasons. And the kind of 
knowledge we have achieved is closely related to those reasons for and against theories. 
What justifies philosophical practice is not something external to it, but something that 





A substantive part of Analytic Philosophy is based on intuitions as reasons to accept or 
reject propositions. Such procedure has been widely questioned. One objection is the one 
made by Earlenbaugh and Molyneux. Their argument concludes that intuition cannot 
count as evidence. I have shown how it can, even if Philosophy is not restricted to 
describing our conceptual scheme, if we distinguish between evidence and conclusive 
evidence. The expert’s intuitions that produce a parallel belief justify what is intuited, 
because the expert’s beliefs provide prima facie justification. This explains why it seems 
reasonable to suspend judgment when faced with a disagreement on intuitions between 
experts. Nevertheless, this does not prove that philosophical practice based on intuitions 
is justified. But it is, because it increases our philosophical knowledge. Or at least some 
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